Brigham Young University Law School

BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Supreme Court Briefs

2001

Solar Salt Company v. Southern Pacific
Transportation Company : Brief of Respondent
Utah Supreme Court

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_sc2
Part of the Law Commons
Original Brief Submitted to the Utah Supreme Court; digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law
Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, Brigham Young University, Provo, Utah; machine-generated
OCR, may contain errors.
Van Cott, Bagley, Cornwall and McCarthy; Attorneys for Respondent.
Frank J. Allen; Attorney for Appellant.
Recommended Citation
Brief of Respondent, Solar Salt Company v. Southern Pacific Transportation Company, No. 14427.00 (Utah Supreme Court, 2001).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_sc2/1493

This Brief of Respondent is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah Supreme
Court Briefs by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. Policies regarding these Utah briefs are available at
http://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/utah_court_briefs/policies.html. Please contact the Repository Manager at hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu with
questions or feedback.

^3CUMENT
^
?'
>.9
9
XKET NO

UTAH

SUPREME O
- -i-Rt \Tl
BRIEF

RECEIVED
LAW LIBRARY

REME COURT
OF THE STATE OF UTAH

SEP 15 19;-3
HAM YOUNG UNIVERSITY

J. Reuben Clark Law School
SOLAB SALT C( )1! .1 A H\ ,
a corporation,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
Case No.
14427

vs.
SOUTHERN" PACIFIC TBANNIM UtTATlu.V
COMPANY, a corporation,
Defendant-Respondent.

BRIEF Or RESPONDENT
-a a Mimmarv judgment 01 uic JLUairici L"' • of
Salt Lake County, State of Utah
Honorable Stewart M. Hanson, Sr., Presiding

VAN COTT, liAO
& MCCARTHY
Haldor T. Benson

'GEN WALL

141 East First South
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Attorneys for Defendant-Respondent
Frank J. Allen
351 South State Street
Salt Lake City, Ulah SI III
Attorney for

Plaintiff-Appellant

r

I1L=, r
_Zm

KjuMa^if'

r/i AY 3 - 'ii>'3
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.Clerk, Saptair.o Court, Uteh
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

iv r

LA*

i^cdctf 4* 14427 R

A

MpuA\

^%

2^2)

5 DEC 197

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

TABLE OF CONTENTS
Page
NATURE OF CASE

1

DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT

1

RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL

2

STATEMENT OF FACTS

2

ISSUE PRESENTED

2

POINT I.
SOLAR, AS A NON-EXCLUSIVE LICENSEE OF THE
STATE OF UTAH, HAS NO COMPENSABLE CLAIM
AGAINST SOUTHERN PACIFIC

3

A. The History of the Litigation

3

B. Solar's Present Position

6

POINT II.
SOLAR'S FURTHER ARGUMENTS ARE UNGUIDED
AND IRRELEVANT

8

CONCLUSION

9
CASES CITED

Erie Railroad Company v. Tomkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938)

5

Hardy Salt Company v. Southern Pacific Transportation Company,
501 F.2d 1156 (10th Cir. 1974) cert, denied
419 U.S. 1033 (1974)
4, 5, 6, 8
Morton International, Inc. v. Southern Pacific Transportation
Company, 27 U.2d 256, 495 P.2d 31 (1972) cert, denied
409 U.S. 934 (1972)
3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8
STATUTES CITED
Section 401, 33 United States Code, Rivers & Harbors Act of 1899.... 5

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE STATE OF UTAH
SOLAR SALT COMPANY,
a corporation,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
vs#

SOUTHERN PACIFIC TRANSPORTATION
COMPANY, a corporation,
;
Defendant-Respondent.

\
I
J
v
I
I
j
J

Case No.
14427

BRIEF OF RESPONDENT
NATURE OF THE CASE
This is an action in which Solar Salt Company (hereinafter
"Solar"), seeks damages and injunctive relief against Southern
Pacific Transportation Company (hereinafter "Southern Pacific"),
for changes in salt content and lake elevation in the Great Salt Lake,
allegedly resulting from Southern Pacific's construction of a causeway across the Great Salt Lake.
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT
Based upon the pleadings, memoranda, other documents on file
and the arguments of counsel, the lower Court, the Honorable Stewart
M. Hanson, Sr., presiding, granted Southern Pacific's Motion for
Summary Judgment, dismissing Solar's Complaint with prejudice.1
(R. 99,100.)
1

Solar did not assert to the Court the Second Cause of Action of its Complaint, which was
based upon a third-party beneficiary theory, and in effect, stipulated that that cause of action
was without merit. (R. 88.)

l
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RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Appellant does not enunciate in its brief the relief which it seeks
on appeal to this Court, but presumably, appellant seeks to have the
judgment of the District Court reversed.

STATEMENT OF FACTS

>*

While the factual statement in Solar's brief may be accepted as
correct for the purpose of this appeal, its statement of facts is fragmentary; partially irrelevant and, therefore, misleading in certain
major respects and must be supplemented. There is no issue as to
any material fact. (Solar's Br., p. 4.)
First and foremost, Solar's business activities, concerned in this
lawsuit, relate to the Great Salt Lake and involve the withdrawal of
water from the Lake for the purpose of extracting salt (sodium
chloride) therefrom. (R. 30-48). Solar's right to extract salt from the
Great Salt Lake derives from a Royalty Agreement entered into with
the State of Utah as of May 20, 1955.2 (R. 17-20, 25, 26, 33-37.)
Solar complains of damage to its salt extraction operations due to
diminution of salt content and higher Lake elevation, allegedly caused
by Southern Pacific's causeway (R. 4) and contends that Southern
Pacific should be held liable for such damages under various legal
theories. (R. 5, 6.)
ISSUE PRESENTED
The controlling issue involved in this appeal is whether or not
Judge Hanson, Sr., was correct in ruling, in effect, that Solar had no
right to salt contained in the water of the Lake upon which to base
its action for damages and injunctive relief against Southern Pacific.
2

Solar's omission of these fundamental facts is commented upon, infra, pp. 6-8.

2
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POINT J
S< )J A B , AS A NON-EXCLUSIVE L I C E N S E E OF T H E
S T A T E OF UTAH, HAS NO COMPENSABLE CLAIM
AGAINST SOUTHERN P A C I F I C .
A

;

l i s t o r y of ; •;. i M i.^ai '.m

The foregoing portion of this brief relates only a small part of
the history of this case as it fits into a larger history of Great Salt
Lake cases involving several litigants.
The first case wa- br-MiiJn by Mort-n International Inc., in ilie
TIM-.I

District Court, Salt Lake County, Utah, ..u NKober 27, 1970.3

L. h". iike Solar, asserted rights to take sail from \\n- Great Salt
Lake based upwn a t-t-nniu royalty agreement which Morton had entered inlu witii id. s;ni< *.\ 1 all, M( »rton contended, like Solar, that
Southern Pacific's causeway was causing dilution of brines in
lih-

.am of the Great Salt Lake, resulting in damages to Morton.

-M;;!:

Muiton also sought an injunction to require modification of the
causeway.
The District Court's summary judgment dismissing

Morton's

complaint was affinm-d unanimously by this Court and that decision4
establishes1 the coin milium ,-ind guiding precedent for the subsequently
filed cases. In arriving at its decision in M- Morton case, this Court
was offered assistance by both Solar ;:;-

:

Hardy Salt Company, as

:

friend- =•! t "- Court, so tliat the ( •our: \\i»i;!u appreciate the scope of
n> ,'i'i .-:.-*i wiul also be apprised of all wl the legal theories that Morton
3
Other cases were filed by Sanders Brine Shrimp Company and Hardy Salt Company in
November and December, 1970, respectively, and the present case, the last one, was filed December 31, 1970.

^Morton International, Inc. v. Southern Pacific Transportation Company, 27 U.2d 256,
495 P.2d 31 (1972), cert, denied. 409 U.S. 934 (1972).

3
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might be entitled to recover under, whether or not Morton previously
had explicitly asserted all of such theories.5
With the position and theories of the three complaining salt companies thus expressed to it, this Court held that:
(Morton's) right to divert and precipitate the salt is a nonexclusive right, and that no matter what you call it . . . the
right is circumscribed by the provisions of Title 65-1-15, U.C.A.
1953, reserving to the State the salt in the water, to be sold
by the state land board only upon a royalty basis6. . . .
And that notwithstanding conceded damage to Morton,
[T]here is no compensable claim here because (Morton) has
no exclusive right against the State or others to the salt or the
water from which it is recovered. . . . 27 IT.2d at 259.
Southern Pacific submits that the foregoing, clearcut ruling by
this Court is applicable directly to Solar's claim in this action for
damage to its salt extraction business and demonstrates the propriety
of the District Court's judgment of dismissal.7 Courts to which the
other Great Salt Lake cases were submitted agree.
The cases brought by Hardy and Sanders8 were consolidated for
trial before Judge Willis W. Bitter. Further, those two cases were
joined at the request of Morton-Norwich Products, Inc., successor to
Morton, by a third case which Morton-Norwich filed in the United
States District Court for the District of Utah, after this Court's
decision in the original Morton case.9
Hbid., 27 U.2d 256, 259, 260.
(i
The royalty agreement from which Morton's rights stemmed is the same form of royalty
agreement underlying Solar's rights. 27 U.2d 259, 260 (R. 33-37.)
7
Solar's attempt to extricate itself from the commonality of basic position that it shares with
Morton and Hardy is discussed below.
8
n.3, supra.
9
This attempted second-bite at the apple by Morton was based upon alleged violations of the
federal Rivers and Harbors Act of 1899. 33 U.S.C. §401.

4
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These three cases were tried on a single record wiii l ;iu* plaintiffs relying to an extent upon the evidence offered by cacii other.
At the close of plaintiffs' evidence, Southern Pacific moved the Court
to dismiss all three complaints. After argument from all *»f the parties
was heard, the r n u r t granted Mir molifMi. Tlif '*<>un (*um<hi(l'>d that
the decision <:!" :hi- i'mirt in Morton, supra, was applicable and ^nn
trollimr, r.u-1 i!-i; . ^. * i • - - the decision :^ /•>/<' • Tonkins,10

the Court

1

was I)u!i!;ii b> ^!i<* decision <>l' )!ii> r.^iri. Tin Court also ruled that
the Rivers and Harbors Act of 1899, supra, did not apply to the Great
Salt Lake since it was a navigable body of water of the State of IJath,
not ci navigable body nf \\<iirr of the United States. That decision
was appealed to the I'liii^! States Court of Appeals for the 'IVniii
Circuit, and affirmed unanimously. 11

Before the Tenth Circuit, Hardy Salt Company repeated various
legal theories argiu ; \r, Judge Ritter as premises for distinguishing
Hit ;;4.:,iti o'i \{* position from., that of Morton, in an attempt to allude
iiii controlling, precedential effect ui this COUJ-CS decision in the
Morton case. The theories thus argued by Hardy included all of the
theories asserted by Solar in this appeal 1 - and prevn-nsh raised before
this Court in a ;

.•-

'•;• i

- nmiueu uy i i a u u

. t nd ISolar in Uie

Morton case.18 The LiM-uit '* i.irt considered all of those theories —
nuisance, waste, pollution ;md >>>1erferenee with business interests —
and rejected tlu-n

!'•<«• r.?;ir : held that they provided no basis for

distinguishing urn* •.<'
namely Morton.

«*»--:;|.-,:iv,s position from

' , *-'

**>' another,

14

10

Erie Railroad Company v. Tomkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938).

11

Hardy Salt Company v. Southern Pacific Transportation Company, 501 F.2d 1136 (10th
Cir. 1974), cert, denied, 419 U.S. 1033 (1974).
12

Hardy Brief to the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals, pp. 28-38. (Appendix A.)

13

Brief of Solar Salt Company, Amicus Curiae, pp. 1-5, 8-10; Brief of Hardy Salt Company,
Amicus Curiae, pp. 9-11, 18-24. (Appendix B.)
"501 F.2d 1161-65.

5
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Eeading through form to substance, the Court reasoned:
The interference with business interests was the precise injury
that Morton complained of in its State Court suit. And the
rejection of such claims of interference with Morton's business
was based upon the principle that only a nonexclusive right
to extract salt existed under the royalty agreement and §65-1-15
of the Utah statutes providing for royalty agreements and the
taking of salt. We must agree that Hardy'}s rights can rise no
higher since they come from the same basic source as those of
Morton, (Emphasis added.) 501 F.2d 1163-64.
B.

Solar's Present Position.
As indicated above, Solar's Great Salt Lake complaint was the

last of a series of complaints to be filed. The Solar case remained
dormant, more or less, as the Morton case progressed to a final determination. Shortly after the Morton decision, Southern Pacific moved
the District Court to enter a Summary Judgment, dismissing Solar's
Complaint under the controlling precedent of this Court's decision in
Morton, (R. 49-76.) Solar made no response to the motion at that time,
and the case became dormant again while the Hardy, Sanders and
Morton-Norwich cases were litigated actively. 15 Following the final
determination of those cases, as described above, Southern Pacific
supplemented the legal authorities in support of its motion; 10 Solar
responded 17 and the judgment now appealed from was entered.
Taking a somewhat confusing, and perhaps extreme position,
Solar apparently now is seeking reversal of the District Court's judgment upon the premise that the prior decisions in the Morton
Hardy cases are not controlling, persuasive precedents as to it.

and

18

15

Solar's counsel also represented Sanders Brine Shrimp Company in these three cases which
were consolidated for trial and appeal.
i6 (R. 77-84.)
^ ( R . 87-97.)
18

Solar Brief, Points I and II. Points III through V of Solar's Brief also fall within its basic
arguments stated in Points I and II.

6
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The extreme position and length to which Solar extends itself in
the attempt to establish a unique position as an extractor of salt from
the Great Salt Lake is underscored in its statement of its position
before this Court t h a t :
Solar, in this action, does not rely on contractual rights except
to establish the value of its enterprise. 19
This statement, of course, is a direct contradiction of Solar's
sworn answers to interrogatories wherein Solar identified its Royalty
Agreement and Lease Agreement with the State of Utah as a source
of right underlying its complaint. 20 More important, however, is the
conclusive legal impact which this statement has upon Solar's standing to maintain this action. The only right which Solar can have with
regard to the salt in the Great Salt Lake must be obtained by contract
with the State — its Eoyalty Agreement with the State. As this Court
reasoned in Morton:
' [ T ] h e state as the owner of the beds of navigable bodies of
water is entitled to all valuable minerals in or on them' . . . .
(Morton's) right to divert and precipitate the salt is a nonexclusive right, and that no matter what you call it . . . the
right is circumscribed by the provisions of Title 65-1-15, U.C.A.
1953, reserving to the State, the salt in the water, to 'be sold
by the state land board only upon a royalty basis.' 27 U.2d
258, 259.
Solar's abandonment of even the contractual right that it had to
purchase the salt under its royalty agreement with the State, only
adds further grounds in support of the validity and accuracy of the
District Court's judgment of dismissal.
19

Solar Brief, p. 5.

20

(R. 24, 25, 30-37.) The contention in Solar's brief, p. 2., that its Statement of Facts is
not controverted by its Answers to Interrogatories does not apply to its asserted legal standing
to maintain the Complaint herein. In the latter posture, it attempts to use shifting sand in place
of bed rock that it does not have for a foundation.

7
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POINT I I .
SOLAR'S F U R T H E R ARGUMENTS A R E UNGUIDED
AND I R R E L E V A N T .
Solar's arguments concerning the non-applicability of the Morton
and Hardy decisions to its theoretical assertions are answered largely
in the foregoing sections of this brief. However, some limited response to certain abstract, observation-comments by Solar may be
appropriate.
In Solar's Statement of Facts, 21 recitation is made of its involvement in the salt extraction industry on the Great Salt Lake and the
damage to its business in that regard. Solar then poses the issue to
be resolved by this Court as " whether the law of Utah affords any
relief to Solar in the fact situation stated." (Solar Br., p. 4.) Southern Pacific submits that that question is answered fully, and negatively, in the foregoing sections of this brief, insofar as Solar's facts
and business are concerned. Solar, however, apparently would have
the Court theorize on hypothetical situations not before it. Conceding
that its own position provides no standing to sue, Solar conjectures:
Dilution alone may not give rise to a cause of action, but it is
a different matter to so change the lake that acquatic life is
destroyed, recreational values are lost, and industrial water
uses are impaired. (Solar Br., p. 7)
The record is devoid of any suggestion that Solar is involved with
aquatic life in the Lake or recreational use of the Lake, and its case
does not rest on marine biology or recreation. Solar's involvement
with industrial use of the Lake to the extent that it extracts salt
therefrom, is its case, and on that basis, Southern Pacific submits that
the District Court properly dismissed Solar's complaint herein.
21

Solar Br., pp. 2-4.

8
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CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, it is respectfully submitted that the
judgment below should be affirmed.
Respectfully submitted,
VAN COTT, BAGLEY,
CORNWALL & MCCARTHY
Haldor T. Benson
Attorneys for DefendantRespondent.

9
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that on the .«£&.

day of April, 1976,1 served

two copies of the foregoing Brief of Respondent upon PlaintiffAppellant, Solar Salt Company, by delivering two copies thereof to
its attorney at the address indicated:
Frank J. Allen
351 South State Street
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111

Attorney for DefendantRespondent
Southern Pacific
Transportation Company
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APPENDIX A
IN THE
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
IN THE TENTH CIRCUIT
Nos. 73-1714, 73-1715, 73-1716
HARDY SALT COMPANY,
Plaintiff-Appellant,

SOUTHERN PACIFIC
TRANSPORTATION COMPANY,
Defendant-Appellee,
GREAT SALT LAKE MINERALS
& CHEMICALS CORPORATION,
Intervener Defendant.
*

*

*

*

SANDERS SHRIMP COMPANY,
Plaintiff-Appellant,

SOUTHERN PACIFIC
TRANSPORTATION COMPANY,
Defendant-Appellee.
*

*

*

*

MORTON-NORWICH PRODUCTS, INC.
Plaintiff-Appellant,

SOUTHERN PACIFIC
TRANSPORTATION COMPANY,
Defendant-Appellee.
Appeal from the United States District Court
For the District of Utah, Central Division
BRIEF OF PLAINTIFF-APPELLANT
HARDY SALT COMPANY
Of Counsel:
F. WILLIAM McCALPIN
Lewis, Rice, Tucker, Allen
and Chubb
611 Olive Street
St. Louis, Missouri 63101

J. THOMAS GREENE
GIFFORD W. PRICE
GREENE and NEBEKER
Attorneys for Appellant
400 Kennecott Building
Salt Lake City, Utah 84133
Al
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[28]
Amendment is the preservation of his substantial
right to redress by some effective procedure."
Gibbs v. Zimmerman, 290 U. S. 326, 332 (1933).

POINT II.
THE COURT ERRED IN DISMISSING APPELLANT'S
CLAIMS BECAUSE IRRESPECTIVE OF THE SPECIFIC WATER AND MINERAL RIGHTS GRANTED
BY THE STATE OF UTAH, APPELLANT MAY OBTAIN INJUNCTIVE RELIEF OR DAMAGES FOR INJURY TO ITS BUSINESS AND ECONOMIC INTERESTS CAUSED BY ACTS OF THE APPELLEE.
A. Negligence and/or Other Tortious Acts in Violation of Law.
It is submitted that the Southern Pacific has no right
or privilege to interfere with Hardy's economic and business interests. Hardy is entitled to have such economic
and business interests protected against unreasonable or
tortious interference by the Southern Pacific even if,
arguendo, Hardy's rights are termed merely a non-exclusive
"privilege" or "license." The aforesaid Morton decision
certainly does not reach this issue.
For purposes of this argument, the facts as presented
at trial by Hardy Salt must be accepted as true. Among
other things, it must be accepted that the Southern Pacific
knew that its total earth fill causeway likely would adversely affect the Great Salt Lake, so as to cause chemical
changes and the transportation of salt from south to north
of the fill. Also, it must be accepted that expenses for operation of Hardy's business are being seriously increased beA2
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[29]
cause of the action of the Southern Pacific in constructing
and maintaining a fill causeway. In essence, facts were presented at trial to the effect that the fill causeway unreasonably interferes with the use and enjoyment by Hardy Salt
of its facilities and property, thereby causing harm to economic interests and business of Hardy unreasonably and
without justification.
Undue interference with legitimate economic and business interests of others is actionable. Prosser, Handbook
on the Law of Torts, page 974.
The Utah Supreme Court recognized this principle in
Reese v. Qualtrough, 48 Utah 23, 156 Pac. 956 (1916):
" I t is not necessary to multiply illustrations,
wrhich might well be done. When one interferes
with my grocery, livery, or fish business he interferes with my property; and when he destroys my
business he destroys my property."
(156 Pac. at
959, emphasis added.)
The case of Maddox v. International Paper Co., et al.,
47 F . Supp. 829, 105 F . Supp. 89, 203 F . 2d 88 (5th Cir.
1942) bears a relationship to the situation at bar. In that
case plaintiff brought an action for damages to its business,
which had been established on a bayou in 1923. Plaintiff's
business consisted of " . . . renting boats, catching and selling
commercial fish, renting camp houses, serving fish dinners.
In short, (plaintiff) maintained and operated an up-to-date
and clean commercial fishing camp and prospered in the
business." (47 F . Supp. at 830.) The Court noted that in
1938, a predecessor of International Paper Co. erected a
large pulp and paper mill " a t a cost in excess of twelve
A3
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[30]

million dollars." In the course of operations, International
Paper Co. dumped great amounts of waste water containing
refuse into the river on which the plaintiff was relying for
his business. The waste water which was being dumped
into the river brought about a polluted situation causing
death of fish and discoloration of the water. Plaintiff sued
the defendant asserting that the act of one man which
causes injury to another is compensable. The court held
for plaintiff, and stated:
Though we see no need of persuasive authority, as the Louisiana decisions are quite to the
point, we find that action for damages to one's business caused by the pollution of a stream has been
recognized by courts of other jurisdictions, . . .
#

#

#

The proof in this case is very consistent on
the point that the plaintiff had a thriving prosperous business before the pollution of the stream,
and after the pollution of the stream he had no
business left and his manner of making a living
was taken from him; therefore, the only question
remaining in the case is the amount of damage to
which the plaintiff is entitled. (47 F. Supp. 829,
831.)
In this case there was no discussion of water rights or
fishing rights per se. Also, there was no emphasis upon
public ownership of the fish. The Court's concern was that
a business which had been developed over the years and
which had thrived was being unreasonably interfered with
by another business which has no license or right to so interfere. Since this interference caused economic hardship
and interference with economic interest, it was held to be
actionable, and the plaintiff was allowed the relief sought.
A4
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[31]
Another case which demonstrates this point is Bay
State Lobster Company, Inc. v. Perini Corp., 355 Mass. 794,
245 N. E. 2d 759 (1969). Plaintiff had a lobster business
wherein he relied on the water in a bay being of a certain
nature and quality. Defendant was involved in dredging operations and had secured permission to undertake such. The
dredging operations interfered with plaintiff's business by
adversely disturbing and affecting the bay waters. The
court held for plaintiff, declaring that: " A license does not
constitute a defense to an action for negligence." (245
N. E. at 760.) Accord: West Muncie Strawhoard Company
v. Slack, 164 Ind. 21, 72 N. E. 878 (1904); Tutwiler Coal
Company v. Nicols, 145 Ala. 666, 39 So. 762 (1905); Hodges
v. Pine Products Company, 135 Ga. 134, 68 S. E. 1107
(1910); Carson v. Hercules Powder Company, 240 Ala, 887,
402 S.W. 2d 640 (1966).

B. Public Nuisance — Pollution and Obstruction in
Violation of Law.
The Southern Pacific has no right or privilege to
alter the Great Salt Lake so as to cause injury resulting
therefrom. It is submitted that the chemical alterations
being caused by the Southern Pacific causeway, including
dilution of the brines, violates the Utah anti-pollution statute and such violation is actionable by Hardy Salt Company. Also, the damming effect of the causeway violates
Utah's anti-obstruction statute and is likewise actionable.
The Utah Code provides:
Pollution means such contamination, or other alteration of the physical, chemical or biological
properties, of any waters of the state or such disA5
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[32]

charge of any liquid, gaseous or solid substance into any waters of the state as will create a nuisance
or render such waters harmful or detrimental or
injurious to public health, safety or welfare, or to
domestic, commercial, industrial, agricultural, recreational, or other legitimate beneficial uses, or to
livestock, wild animals, birds, fish or other aquatic
life. Section 73-14-2(a), U.C.A. (Emphasis added.)
It shall be unlaw fid for any person to cause pollution as defined in Section 73-14-2(a) of any waters
of the state or to place or cause to be placed any
waste in location where they will cause pollution
of any waters of the state. Any such action is
hereby declared to be a public nuisance. Section
73-14-5, U.C.A. (Emphasis added.)

;

Utah statutory law also denominates obstructions as a public nuisance:
A public nuisance is a crime against the order
and economy of the state, and consists in unlawfully doing any act, or omitting to perform any
duty, which act or omission either:
*

#

#

(3) Unlawfully interferes with, obstructs or -.':\
tends to obstruct, or renders dangerous for passage, any lake, stream, canal or basin, or any public
park, square, street or highway. (Emphasis added.) (Section 76-43-3, U.C.A.)
Southern Pacific is polluting the Great Salt Lake as
defined by statute, and Hardy is suffering great damage
as a proximate result thereof. Southern Pacific has no license, privilege, right or otherwise to do so. These issues
were not raised in pleadings of Morton Salt in the heretofore referred to state court case, were not discussed in the
A6
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[33]

Briefs, and were not argued before the Utah Supreme Court
in the said Morton decision.
Hardy Salt has suffered special harm by reason of
Southern Pacific's "nuisance," including violation of the
aforesaid statutes. Protection afforded plaintiff is akin to
that set forth in a well-reasoned line of cases throughout
the country concerning fish and fishing businesses.
In the case of Columbia River Fishermen's Protective
Union v. City of St. Helens, 160 Ore. 654, 87 P. 2d 195,
(1939), plaintiffs filed suit to restrain defendants from polluting certain rivers. Oregon statutory law prohibited the
pollution of streams and public rivers of the state causing
destruction of fish life. The Oregon court recognized that
ownership of the fish before being taken was in the State
of Oregon, pointing out that the suit was not brought for
the purpose of obtaining the fish, but to protect the right
of fishermen to pursue their vocation of fishing. Plaintiffs,
having a special interest to protect, were granted standing
to sue, the court stating:
To delete the fish from the Columbia and Willamette Eivers is to prevent the plaintiffs from pursuing their vocations and earning their livelihood
fishing with gill nets in the portions of the river
where they have been accustomed to fish. (87 P.
2d at 197, emphasis added.)
#

#

*

There is a vital distinction between the rights of
plaintiffs, who are accustomed to fishing in the
river and have a license to do so, and the rights of
other citizens of the state, who never fish in the
river and do not intend to and are interested only
in a general way in the benefit the state receives
A7
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by the prosecution of a valuable industry . . . (87 P.
2d at 197, emphasis added.)
(By analogy, Hardy Salt in the instant action is in the
position of plaintiffs, with a special interest to protect
based in part upon an unquestioned state granted right to
extract salt, as compared with the rights of other citizens
who might complain about the alteration and "pollution"
of the Great Salt Lake as constituting a public nuisance.)
In Hampton v. North Carolina Pulp Co., 223 N. C. 535,
27 S. E. 2d 538 (1943), the court adopted a similar posture.
An action was brought by the plaintiff to recover damages
for injury to his business and fishery on the Roanoke River,
alleging that defendant was liable for the improper act of
discharging noxious or deleterious substances from its pulp
plant into the river, thus causing "pollution." Plaintiff
owned certain lands adjacent to the waters of the river, as
does Hardy to the Lake, and for more than 25 years was
involved in the business of commercially taking and distributing fish. The gravamen of plaintiff's complaint was
that pollution caused by defendant's dumping was " . . . inimical to the fish inhabiting said waters, to such an extent
and in such volume and quantity as to interfere with the
free and long established passage, migration and habit of
said fish from the ocean on their way to the spawning
grounds in the upper reaches of the Roanoke River, and
past the properties of the plaintiff, thus to a large extent
destroying the fish and diverting said migratory pilgrimage, so as to seriously damage the business of the plaintiff
and the profit from the use of his premises." (27 S. E. 2d
at 539, emphasis added.)

A8
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Holding that plaintiff had standing to sue, the court

stated:
The law will not permit a substantial injury to the
person or property of another by a nuisance, though
public and indictable, to go without individual redress, whether the right of action be referred to the
existence of a special damage, or to an invasion of
a more particular and more important personal
right. The personal right involved here is the security of an established business. (27 S. E. 2d at
545, emphasis added.)
Accord: Carson v. Hercules Powder Co., 240 Ark.
887, 402 S. W. 2d 640 (1966); J. H. Miles & Co.,
v. McLean Contracting Co., 180 F . 2d 789 (4th
Cir.1950).
The position of Hardy Salt is similar to that of the
plaintiffs in the aforesaid cases. Hardy Salt acquired lands
adjacent to the Great Salt Lake and in reliance thereon
Hardy Salt and its predecessors have built and maintained
a salt business for years. The location of H a r d y ' s land and
business is crucial not only from the standpoint of the operation of precipitating salt per se, but the ready availability of different forms of transportation and the accessibility to markets. Hardy's rights pre-date construction of
the causeway and the granting of an " e a s e m e n t " to the
Southern Pacific with respect thereto. Most decidedly,
Southern Pacific's position is distinguishable from that of
other salt operations. Other salt companies have a right
to precipitate and take salt; Southern Pacific does not.
A public nuisance also exists under Utah statutory law
where an unlawful obstruction has been created on a public
A9
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lake. The dam-like effect of the causeway is such an unlawful obstruction, and as such also constitutes a public
nuisance in violation of Utah's anti-obstruction statute.
C. Private Nuisance.
The Utah Code provides:
Anything which is injurious to health, or indecent,
or offensive to the senses, or an obstruction to the
free use of property, so as to interfere with the
comfortable enjoyment of life or property, is a nuisance and the subject of an action. Such action
may be brought by any person whose property is
injuriously affected, or whose personal enjoyment
is lessened by nuisance; and by the judgment the
nuisance may be enjoined or (abated), and damages may also be recovered. (U.C.A. 1953 78-38-1
— Emphasis added.)
Appellant's business and economic interests and use
of real property are entitled to protection under this statute. Hardy's property and rights are "injuriously affected" by the Southern Pacific causeway. The Morton
decision does not refer to private nuisance in general, nor
the aforesaid statutory nuisance specifically.
D. Waste.
By construction of its fill causeway the Southern Pacific has created a phenomena which is causing the waste
and drainage of a valuable resource. Assuming as true the
factual evidence presented at trial by Hardy, millions of
tons of salt are being carried to the north end of the lake
and being precipitated there in such a way that recovery of
this resource is difficult or impossible. In any event, sodium
chloride is being "wasted" as to Hardy and other salt exA10
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tractors dependent upon brine waters south of the causeway.
Waste has been defined as " t h e violation of an obligation to treat the premises in such a manner that no harm
be done to them and that the estate may revert to those
having an underlying interest undeteriorated by any tvillful
or negligent act." (93 C.J.S. 560. Emphasis added.) As
stated in Tiffany:
Generally speaking, the person in possession
is required, in the course of his utilization of the
land, the making or causing physical changes
thereon and therein, to do so in such a way as not
unreasonably to injure one who has a right or possibility of future possession. A failure to comply
with this requirement is what ordinarily constitutes waste. Tiffany, The Law of Real Property,
3rd Ed., Vol. II, p. 629.
It is submitted that Hardy Salt, by reason of its property
rights set forth in its Royalty Agreement in combination
with its water rights, and by reason of its economic interests
otherwise, has a right to complain of waste. In addition,
Hardy is well within the category of those who may complain of waste under Utah statutory law:
If a guardian, tenant for life or years, joint
tenant or tenant in common of real property commits waste thereon, any person aggrieved by the
ivaste may bring an action against him therefor,
in which action there may be a judgment for treble
damages. 78-38-2 U.C.A. 1953.
Unquestionably, Hardy is a person aggrieved and is
entitled to maintain action for the waste of this valuable
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resource which would not be so wasted "but for" the construction of the fill causeway by the Southern Pacific
Transportation Company. This issue of waste was not
raised in the Morton case, the Southern Pacific objected
to its consideration, and the Morton decision does not cover
it.
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IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE STATE OF UTAH
MORTON INTERNATIONAL, INC.,
a corporation,
*
'

m

. ..,, A
.
77
Plaintiff-Appellant,

vs.

SOUTHERN PACIFIC
TRANSPORTATION COMPANY,
P

'

Case No.
12557

Defendant-Respondent.

BRIEF OF SOLAR SALT COMPANY,
5 AMICUS CURIAE

NATURE OF AMICUS CURIAE INTEREST
Solar Salt Company, herein called "Solar" is engaged in business enterprise of the same nature (although on somewhat different legal foundations) as
the enterprise the appellant seeks to protect by the instant litigation. Solar has major investment in plant
on the south shore of Great Salt Lake by which lake
brines are transported from the lake and dehydrated
for recovery of the sodium chloride content. Solar in
part relies, for its rights to transport the waters and
harvest the salt, upon contracts with and grants from
the State of Utah including a "royalty agreement"
which is of the same genre as the royalty agreement
in evidence here.
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Solar has the same concern as appellant about
the respondent's having caused the migration of billions of tons of sodium chloride to that part of the lake
north of the causeway and the waste of that salt by its
deposit on the lake bed there. Solar has experienced
increasing difficulty and expense in producing salt from
the south lake brines as they become more and more
dilute, and Solar has commenced suit to compel respondent to provide a remedy.
ISSUE OF CONCERN TO SOLAR
The issue to which this brief is addressed is this:
"Does an owner of land adjacent to Great Salt
Lake who enters into a royalty agreement with
the State of the kind here in evidence and who,
in reliance on that agreement, makes capital
investments and develops a profitable business
enterprise have standing to sue a third party
who drains and wastes the resource to which the
agreement relates ?"
ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE RIGHTS GRANTED BY THE ROYALTY
AGREEMENT ARE SUFFICIENT TO SUPPORT AN
ACTION FOR WASTE, AND THE COMPLAINT
STATES SUCH ACTION
Respondent, throughout its oral and written arguments, has adopted the concept that the dissolved
salts and suspended solids in Great Salt Lake brines
are a part of the really. According to respondent, ownB3
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ership of the resource which concerns us here is entailed in ownership of the lakebed. At page 6 of its
brief, respondent says:
^
i
' That the State of Utah owns the salt and other
minerals contained in the water of the lake is
unquestionable. Under the established constitutional principle of equality of the states, title
to the beds of all streams and lakes which were
navigable at the time of Utah's statehood passed
to the State."
Accepting this analysis, arguendo, we submit
that the complaint herein effectively states a cause of
action for waste. The complaint alleges that respondent, legally occupying Great Salt Lake bed for causeway construction and operation purposes, has so
constructed and operated that facility as to cause the
lake's sodium chloride to migrate to the north of the
causeway, precipitate on the north bed in quantities
conservatively measured in millions of tons and thereby
be lost as an economically recoverable resource. The
analogy to the standard textbook illustration of waste
(where a tenant with less than a fee simple interest
destroys the timber on the land) could scarcely be
clearer. Waste is "the violation of an obligation to treat
the premises in such a manner that no harm be done
to them and that the estate may revert to those having
an underlying interest undeteriorated by any willful
or negligent act." (93 CJS 560)
Tiffany (The Law of Real Property, Third Edition,
Volume 2, page 629) analyses the tort of waste as
follows:
B4

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

[4]
"generally speaking, the person in possession
is required, in the course of his utilization of
the land, and in making or causing physical
changes thereon and therein, to do so in such a
way as not unreasonably to injure one who has
a right or possibility of future possession. A
failure to comply with this requirement is what
ordinarily constitutes waste. Waste has been
defined a s " "an unreasonable or improper,
use, abuse, mismanagement, or omission of
duty touching real estate by one rightfully in
possession, which results in its substantial injury." "
It is noteworthy that one kind of right to which the
law, according to Tiffany, affords protection is a "possibility of future possession," and appellant has, under
the least favorable interpretation of its royalty agreement, a possibility of possessing sodium chloride, a
part of the reality. The term "possibility of future
possession" is, of course, subject to interpretation, and
the courts, when left to their own devices, have seldom
if ever found anything less than a classic future interest
to qualify. Utah courts are not, however, left to their
own devices. There is a specific statutory pronouncement on the subject. Section 78-38-2, UCA 1953, as
amended, reads as follows:
"If a guardian, tenant for life or years, joint tenant or tenant in common of real property commits waste thereon, any person aggrieved by the
waste may bring an action against him therefor,
in which action there may be a judgment for
treble damages."
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The statute does not require that the interest of the
"person aggrieved" fall in any category of real property estates. We believe this court will be fully briefed
as to the nature of the estate appellant may properly
claim under the royalty agreement alone or as supplemented by water rights appellant has established by
appropriation or riparian ownership. Whatever determination on the point this court may make, it can hardly
be contended that the removal and waste of the resource
which the salt companies have spent millions to get into
position to recover is not a true source of aggrievement
to them.
POINT II
EVEN I F THE CONDUCT OF EESPONDENT DID
NOT CONSTITUTE THE COMMISSION OF WASTE,
APPELLANT HAS STATUS TO SUE FOE RESPONDENT'S UNREASONABLE INTERFERENCE
WITH AN ECONOMIC INTEREST.
The allegations of the complaint herein are (and
they must be taken to be true) that appellant has made
heavy investment in plant and personnel to realize the
advantages of an agreement with the State of Utah
and rights otherwise acquired to recover sodium chloride
from Great Salt Lake brines. Appellant has in fact
profitably engaged in a salt extraction business since
before Utah's statehood. Respondent has acted to cause
a high percentage of the salt (which would otherwise
have been contained in the brines at appellant's point
of intake) to migrate away from appellant's plant and
to be lost to appellant.
B6
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Maddox v. Internatioanl Paper Company, 41 F. Supp.
829, 105 F. Supp. 89, 203 F. 2nd 88; West Muncie
Strawboard Company v. Slack, 164 Ind. 21, 72 NE 879;
Tutwiler Coal Company v. Nichols, 145 Ala. 666, 39
So. 762; Hodges v. Pine Product Company, 135 Ga.
134; Bay State Lobster Co., Inc., vs. Perini Corp., 245
NE 2d 759; Carson v. Hercules Powder Company, 402
SW 2nd 640 (Arkansas, 1966); J. H. Miles & Company
v. McLean Contracting Co., 180 F 2nd 789 (4th Circuit,
Virginia, 1950).
In none of these cases was it contended that the
plaintiff owned the fish in the water or enjoyed a more
formidable estate in the watercourse than a mere license. The "property"
protected was an economic
interest, a reasonable expectancy of profit from the
utilization of a natural resource if it were left in its
natural state. The defendant in each case interferred
with the natural condition of the waters, and the plaintiff recovered for loss of profit.
POINT III
WITHOUT REFERENCE TO ANY PRESENT OR
FUTURE INTEREST OR ESTATE APPELLANT
MAY HAVE IN THE LAND (I.E. THE LAKE BED
AND THE SALTS DISSOLVED OR SUSPENDED IN
THE LAKE WATERS) RESPONDENT HAS A
DUTY TO UTILIZE LAKE RED IN ITS POSSESSION SO AS NOT TO INJURE NEIGHBORING
LANDS INCLUDING APPELLANT'S.
The complaint herein alleges that respondent
has utilized lake bed land in such a way as to injure
appellant's land neighboring the lake. The injury is inB7
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herent in the facts that (1) the lake waters no longer
circulate in their natural fashion and are held at an
artificially high level on or near appellant's land and
(2) the waters are changed from their natural quality.
This court needs no introduction to the concept
that there are restrictions upon one's mode of utilizing
land in his possession which exist in favor of occupants
of neighboring land. We would refer the court, however,
to the discussion beginning at page 98, Tiffany, Real
Property, Third Edition, Volume 3.
Many of the cases which established the concept
involved offensive noise or odor. By far the most numerous, however, are the cases which involve a defendant's
interference with water or water courses as they flow
through his land, so that the plaintiff, a riparian owner,
finds the water to which his land is adjacent to be diminished in quantity or quality for his purposes. In those
jurisdictions where riparian rights are fully recognized,
there can be no question as to the actionable character
of such conduct. The cases are collected in the West
Digest System, Key 64 et seq., water and water courses.
The issue of consequence here is not whether conduct of the kind complained of is actionable where
riparian doctrine is judicially adopted, but whether a
riparian landowner, under the water law of Utah, has
any right to complain because the water course his land
adjoins has been changed so as to impart less value to
the riparian land.
B8
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It is certainly true that riparian land ownership
entails less interest in the adjacent water under Utah
law than under the common law. In essence, the Utah
courts and legislature have adopted the concept that
beneficial use is the basis, the measure and the limit
of all rights to water. Any common lawT doctrine which
is inconsistent with that concept is not recognized. The
seminal case on the subject is Stowell v. Johnson, 7 U
215, 26 Pac. 260.
This does not necessarily mean that all common law
doctrine related to lakes, streams and water courses
has been rejected. Utah cases still talk about reliction
and accretion, and Utah claims to own the beds of
navigable lakes and streams on a common law7 sovereignty theory. On occasion, Utah cases have recognized
that riparian principles can have application where the
appropriation and riparian concepts are not at war.
In Whitmore v. Salt Lake City, 89 U. 387, the court
referred to a repudiation of riparian rights " i n the
main." In Kano v. Arcon Corporation, 7 U 2d 431,
the defendant upstream user was required to deposit
the water appropriated by the plaintiff downstream user
in the natural channel at the boundary of plaintiff's
land. The court there talked about " t h e easement one
has in a natural stream leading to his property conveying appropriated water."
The message of the Utah cases is that riparian
owners will not be permitted to assert any rights by
reason of riparian ownership which will in any way
B9
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the Royalty Agreement as postulated in the premise of
the Southern Pacific argument, Morton has an exclusive
quantitative properly interest in water, the property
from which salt is " m i n e d " or precipitated. The exclusivity of interest is established by the State in combining
the right to salt (Royalty Agreement) with appropriation
of the water. With the union of its water rights and
Royalty Agreement, Morton became entitled to a quantum of water, i.e., the amount placed to beneficial use in
order to extract salt as such is found in the natural state
of the water.

2. Morton is entitled to protection from interference by the Southern Pacific with the natural
quality of its water rights.
Besides a right in priority and quantity, an appropriator of water is entitled to the water in its natural
state, thus having a right in the constancy of quality as
related to beneficial use of the water. Salt Lake City v.
Boundary Springs Water Users Association, 2 Utah 2d
141, 144, 290 P.2d 453 (1954), Crane v. Winsor, 2 Utah
248, 253, (1878), Rocky Ford Irrigation Company, et al.
v. Kents Lake Reservoir Company, et ah, 104 Utah 202,
135 P.2d 108 (1943), The Utah Law of Water
Rights,
Wells A. Hutchins, Dallin W. Jensen, Oct. 1965, p. 45.
Concern for such a vested right in the quality of
water as related to its beneficial use is emphasized by
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the Utah Supreme Court in the Rocky Ford Irrigation
case, supra:
;i
The power company is in somewhat the same
position. It contends that it will suffer substantial
damage to its equipment unless the proposed res; ervoir is so constructed that it will not empty
silt and debris into the stream at times when the
stream ivould otherwise he free from such foreign
matter, i.e., during low water period. It does not
appear what type of dam Kents Lake proposes to
build. It may contemplate a type of construction
which will filter the water or otherwise retain the
debris. As pointed out by the California Supreme
Court in Wright v. Best, 19 Cal. 2d 368, 121 P.2d
702, 709, "an appropriator of waters of a stream,
as against upper owners with inferior rights of
user, is entitled to have the water at his point of
diversion preserved in its natural state of purity,
and amy use which corrupts the water so as to
essentially impair its usefulness for the purposes
to which he originally devoted it, is an invasion of
his rights. Any material deterioration of the
quality of the stream by subsequent appropriators
or others without superior rights entitles him to
both injunctive and legal relief." (135 P.2d at 114)
(Emphasis added.)
This case underscores the right of a senior appropriator to bring action against not only junior appropriators but others who have interfered with the quality
of water rights. Quality of water means quality defined
not by an abstract definition, but as quality relates to
the beneficial use of the water for which an appropriation
is made.

B12

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

[11]
The right to have water in its natural state is emphasized further by the Utah Supreme Court in holding that
an appropriator is entitled to have the water flow in a
natural channel:
An appropriator of the waters of a natural
stream flowing through the public domain acquires an easement over the lands through which
the stream flows for the flow of the water to his
point of diversion, as it was wont to flow when he
first made the appropriation. This right is also
acquired as against the subsequent purchasers of
the lands from the United States and their grantees. It therefore follows that an appropriator
has the implied authority to do all that is necessary to secure the enjoyment of such an easement.
He therefore has the right to go upon the lands
after they have become private and remove obstructions from the bed of the stream, so as to
permit the water to continue its flow in its original channel to the head of his ditch. Tripp v. Bagley, et al, 74 Utah 57, 276 Pac. 912 (1928) (Citing
2 Kinney on Irrigation (2d ed.) Section 991, p.
1751.) (276 P. 912,919)

The Southern Pacific is interfering with the natural
circulation pattern of the Great Salt Lake and all the
streams flowing into it by creating and maintaining a
dam in the form of the causeway. This dam, in turn,
is adversely affecting the quality of waters in several
particulars, including dilution of the salt content within
waters south of the causeway.
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According to this finding (the construction
most favorable to plaintiff of wThich is susceptible) the railroad company granted nothing more
than a license to the plaintiff to mine coal from
the land, and did not grant plaintiff any property
in the coal until it had mined it. As long as the
coal remained in place, it was the property of the
railroad company. . . . The plaintiff could not recover damages on the theory that it had title to
the coal. No doubt, as was said in Baker v. Hart,
supra, the act of the defendants was an infringement of plaintiff's rights, for which it could recover damages as it in fact sustained; but it
proved none. (120 Pac, 715, 718) (Emphasis
added.)
While the two cases above quoted cannot be said to
be directly applicable to the Great Salt Lake because of
the unique nature of rights granted to salt extractors,
they do demonstrate that the legal effect of rights granted, rather than nomenclature, is of paramount significance.
It is submitted that Morton has property interests,
whatever such interests might be "labelled" or "categorized, ' ' which are cognizable in law and are entitled to
protection.

POINT II.
SOUTHERN P A C I F I C H A S NO RIGHT OR
P R I V I L E G E TO I N T E R F E R E W I T H MORTON'S
ECONOMIC I N T E R E S T S .

B14
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As argued supra, Morton has property interests
which are entitled to protection. Legal rights and remedies to achieve such protection extend not just to the
value of the property per se, but to all consequences
stemming from interference with such property interests.
It is submitted that even without demonstrating
a property interest per se, Morton would be and is entitled to have its economic interests protected against
unreasonable interference with said interests. Morton
has developed an extensive business for the extraction
of salt, and even if the carrying on of such business to
precipitate is a mere " p r i v i l e g e " (which, as argued
supra, it certainly is not), Morton is entitled to have its
business interests protected.
For purposes of the appeal, the facts as alleged by
Morton must be accepted as true. In this regard, it is
alleged that the effectiveness of the operations of Morton
Salt is being seriously diminished and impaired because
of the action of the Southern Pacific in constructing and
maintaining a fill causeway. It is further alleged that
the causeway unreasonably interferes with the use and
enjoyment by Morton of its facilities, thereby increasing
the costs of Morton's economic activity without justification.
Undue interference with legitimate economic interests of others is actionable, as in the expectations of
profit therefrom:
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Upon this foundation, a rather formidable
body of law has been erected which in general has
followed along the lines of interference with contract. It has been said that u i n a civilized community which recognizes the right of the private
property among its institutions, the notion is intolerable that a man should be protected by the
law in the enjoyment of property once it is acquired, but left unprotected by the law in his
effort to acquire i t ; " and that since a large part
of what is most valuable in modern life depends
upon "probable expectancies," as social and industrial life becomes more complex the courts
must do more to discover, define and protect them
from undue interference. Prosser, Handbook on
the Law of Torts, p. 974.
The case of Maddox v. International Paper Co., et
al, 47 F. Supp. 829, 105 F. Supp. 89, 203 F.2d 88 (1942)
bears a relationship to the situation at bar. In that case
plaintiff brought an action for damages to its business,
which had been established on a bayou in 1923. The
Court commented that "His business was renting boats,
catching and selling commercial fish, renting camp
houses, serving fish dinners. In short, he maintained and
operated an up-to-date and clean commercial fishing
camp and prospered in the business." (47 F. Supp. at
830) In 1938, a predecessor to International Paper Co.
erected a large pulp and paper mill "at a cost in excess
of twelve million dollars." In the course of operations,
International Paper Co. dumped great amounts of waste
water containing refuse into the river on which the plaintiff was relying for his business. The waste water which
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was being dumped into the river brought about a polluted
situation causing death of fish and discoloration of the
water. Plaintiff sued the defendant asserting that the
act of one man which causes injury to another is compensable. The court held for plaintiff, and stated:
Though we see no need of persuasive authority, as the Louisiana decisions are quite to the
point, we find that action for damages to one's
business caused by the pollution of a stream has
been recognized by courts of other jurisdictions,

The proof in this case is very consistent on
the point that the plaintiff had a thriving prosperous business before the pollution of the stream,
and after the pollution of the stream he had no
business left and his manner of making a living
was taken from him; therefore, the only question
remaining in the case is the amount of damage to
which the plaintiff is entitled. (47 F . Supp. 829,
831.)
In this case there was no discussion of water rights
or fishing rights per se. Also, there was no emphasis
upon public ownership of the fish. The court's concern
was that a business which had been developed over the
years and which had thrived was being unreasonably interfered with by another business which had no license
or right to so interfere. Since this interference caused
economic hardship and interference with economic in-
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terest, it was held to be actionable, and the plaintiff was
allowed the relief sought.
Another case which demonstrates this point is Bay
State Lobster Company, Inc. v. Perini Corp., 245 N.E. 2d
759. In that case, plaintiff had a lobster business wherein
he relied on the water in a bay being of a certain nature
and quality. Defendant was involved in dredging operations and had secured permission to undertake such.
The dredging operations interfered with plaintiff's business by adversely disturbing and affecting the bay
waters. The court held for plaintiff, declaring that: " A
license does not constitute a defense to an action for
negligence." (245 N.E. at 760) Accord: West Muncie
Strawboard Company v. Slack, 164 Ind. 21, 72 N.E. 878;
Tutwiler Coal Company v. Nicols, 145 Ala. 666, 39 So.
762; Hodges v. Pine Product Company, 135 Ga. 134;
Carson v. Hercules Powder Company, 402 S.W. 2d 640
(1966); J. H. Miles & Company v. McLean Contracting
Co., 180 F.2d 789 (1950).
The Southern Pacific has no license, lease, appropriation or other affirmative right with respect to the
waters of the Great Salt Lake. It has no license, lease or
other right with respect to the salt in the Great Salt Lake.
The Southern Pacific has only an easement to construct
and maintain a causeway. Its agreement with the State
of Utah does not give the Southern Pacific license, permission or otherwise negligently to construct a cause-
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way, to construct a causeway which causes a nuisance,
or otherwise to impair the rights of others in the use
and enjoyment of their property. The Southern Pacific
certainly has no license or privilege to construct a causeway which interferes with the economic interest of those
having prior rights.

POINT I I I
T H E P R E S E N T F I L L CAUSEWAY OF T H E
SOUTHERN P A C I F I C IS CAUSING W A S T E OF A
VALUABLE RESOURCE.
By construction of its fill causeway the Southern
Pacific has created a phenomena which is causing the
waste and drainage of a valuable resource. Assuming as
true the factual allegations of Morton, millions of tons
of salt are being carried to the north end of the lake and
being precipitated there in such a way that recovery of
this resource is difficult or impossible. In any event,
sodium chloride is being " w a s t e d " as to Morton and
other salt extractors dependent upon brine water south
of the causeway.
Waste has been defined as " t h e violation of an
obligation to treat the premises in such a manner that no
harm be done to them and that the estate may revert to
those having an underlying interest undeteriorated by
any willful or negligent act." (93 C.J.S. 560) As stated in
Tiffany:
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Generally speaking, the person in possession
is required, in the course of his utilization of the
land, and making or causing physical changes
thereon and therein, to do so in such a way as not
unreasonably to injure one who has a right or
possibility of future possession. A failure to comply with this requirement is what ordinarily constitutes waste. Tiffany, The Law of Real Property, 3rd Ed., Vol. II, p. 629.

It is submitted that Morton Salt, by reason of its property rights set forth in its Royalty Agreement in combination with its water rights, and by reason of its economic interests otherwise has a right to complain of
waste. In addition, however, Morton has express statutory standing to complain of such waste. The Utah
legislature has broadened the category of those who may
complain of waste:
If a guardian, tenant for life or years, joint
tenant or tenant in common of real property
commits waste thereon, any person aggrieved by
the waste may bring an action against him
therefor, in which action there may be a judgment
for treble damages. 78-38-2 U.C.A. 1953 (Emphasis added.)
Unquestionably, Morton is a person aggrieved and is
entitled to maintain action for the waste of this valuable
resource which would not be so wasted " b u t f o r " the
construction of the fill causeway by the Southern Pacific
Transportation Company.
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